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The literature widely documents the negative liquidity impact of foreign participation in firms that permit 
high foreign institutional ownership. This paper employs a unique setting for the limited participation of 
qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) in China’s A-share market and examines how this impacts 
on stock liquidity in emerging markets. Contrary to the findings in the literature, foreign investor 
participation helps enhance the liquidity of affected stocks by promoting trade activities and price 
discovery. The improvement in liquidity does not occur through the information friction channel, but 
rather the real friction channel. Our results are robust to endogeneity issue and the possible influence of 
the global financial crisis, industry effects and the stock exchange. 
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1.  Introduction 
China is by far the world’s largest emerging market. Unlike in many other emerging markets, China’s 
financial market is not completely open to foreign investors and it operates under policies that differ from 
those of other emerging economies.  In this paper, we take advantage of this unique institutional setting to 
re-examine how foreign institutional investors and increased market liberalization influence liquidity. 
In an effort to diversify the domestic financial market’s investor base, the Chinese government has 
implemented policies to encourage the participation of foreign institutional investors. Under the current 
legal framework, foreign investors can invest in A-share listed companies by applying for a QFII 
(Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor) license. 2  Nevertheless, the approach taken by the Chinese 
government to liberalize the financial market is a cautious and conservative one. Unlike many emerging 
economies where foreign institutional investors are permitted to hold more than 50% of the free-float 
value of the equity market, China’s QFII scheme is restrictive: the total shares held by each (all) QFII in 
one listed company is not permitted to exceed 10% (20%) of the total outstanding shares of the company.3 
China’s QFII scheme presents an interesting case study on the relationship between foreign institutional 
participation and stock market liquidity in an environment characterized by low foreign institutional 
ownership. This issue has never been previously examined since most emerging market studies focus on 
firms with high foreign institutional ownership (see Rhee and Wang, 2009; Ng et al., 2011; Prasanna and 
Bansal, 2014). 
A well-known stream of literature argues that large ownership is negatively associated with liquidity. 
Some attribute this negative liquidity effect to the greater adverse selection cost induced by large 
shareholders (Heflin and Shaw, 2000; Brockman and Yan, 2009; Rubin, 2007). Still others argue that a 
large shareholding with inactive trading results in fewer free-float shares available to the public thus 
generating real friction in the stock market (Brockman et al., 2009). Consistent with these studies, Rhee 
and Wang (2009) argue that the negative association between foreign institutional investors and liquidity 
in Indonesia is mainly attributable to information asymmetries between domestic and foreign investors (an 
adverse selection effect) and foreign inactive trading (a real friction effect). Likewise, Ng et al. (2011) 
																																																								
2	China allows foreigners to invest in A-share stocks through the QFII system instituted on December 1, 2002. The 
approved QFIIs were able to make their first trades in A-share stocks on July 9, 2003. The QFII system is regulated 
by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the People’s Bank of China. The QFIIs are defined as 
overseas fund management firms, insurance companies, securities companies, and other asset management 
institutions approved by the CSRC to invest in China’s securities market. They are granted investment quotas by the 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). Term 18 of the Provisional Measure states that QFIIs can invest 
in A-shares, treasuries, convertible bonds and corporate bonds listed in China’s stock exchanges and other financial 
instruments as approved by the CSRC. This system permits overseas institutional investors to buy domestically listed 
stocks in the A-share market. Prior to the QFII system, foreign investors could invest only in the B-share market. 
However, the B-share market is much smaller than the A-share market.2 Foreign institutions want to apply for QFII 
status because this allows them to invest in the much larger A-share market. 
3 Rhee and Wang (2009) document that foreign institutional investors hold as much as 70% of the free-float value of 
the Indonesian equity market, or 41% of the total market capitalization. 
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provide evidence that foreign blockholders are perceived to be informed traders and that their presence 
also dampens trading activity through their inactive trading. Taken together, these studies demonstrate a 
well-documented negative liquidity effect of foreign investors’ participation arising from large foreign 
ownership.  
Studies that demonstrate the positive liquidity effect of foreign institutional participation are few and 
far between. Foreign institutional investors could potentially increase liquidity by improving the 
informational environment and enhancing trading activity in the market. One possible reason for failing to 
demonstrate this evidence is that past studies which focus on foreign institutional investors and liquidity 
could not separate out this positive effect from the large negative foreign ownership effect. In this sense, 
China’s QFII scheme of restricted foreign ownership provides a unique setting for measuring the liquidity 
effect of foreign institutional participation in an environment of low foreign ownership.  
Another important insight to be gained from the study of foreign institutional investors in the Chinese 
A-share market is that there are different types of foreign investors: those who invest through other 
policies4 that are not part of the QFII scheme. These non-QFII foreign institutional investors are long-term 
strategic investors and are subject to fewer government restrictions on their shareholding ceiling. 
Consequently, the foreign ownership associated with these foreign investors is much higher than that of 
QFIIs. It is in this context that China’s A-share market provides an ideal setting for examining the 
different liquidity impacts of foreign institutional investors’ participation with different foreign ownership 
levels. The results of this study can be compared and contrasted against the evidence of a negative 
liquidity impact of internationalization in other emerging markets that have predominantly large foreign 
ownership.  
This paper further examines the channels by which foreign institutional investors influence liquidity. 
The literature suggests two primary mechanisms through which institutional investors can be associated 
with market liquidity by: (1) changing the level of trading activity on the market; and (2) altering the 
information environment of the market. Stoll (2000) refers to the former mechanism as a “real frictions 
effect” and to the latter as an “informational frictions effect”. The presence of foreign institutional 
investors can be linked to the real friction component of liquidity by changing the level of trading activity 
in the market. QFIIs tend to adopt a long-term, buy-and-hold strategy, and their investment strategy is 
closely watched by investors because a bureaucratic and cumbersome license-application process was set 
up to discourage all but the most dedicated of global investors. Consequently, participation by foreign 
																																																								
4  To attract long-term foreign investment, the relevant Chinese authorities (such as the Securities Regulatory 
Commission) have so far enacted the following measures: the Notice of the Relevant Issues concerning the Transfer 
of State-owned Shares and Corporate Shares of Listed Companies to Foreign Investors since 2002-11-01(Expired); 
Interim Provisions for Foreign Investors to Merge Domestic Enterprises since 2003-03-07(Revised); Decision of the 
Ministry of Commerce on Amending the Provisions on the Merger or Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by 
Foreign Investors since 2009-06-22 (Effective); and the Measures for the Administration of Strategic Investment in 
Listed Companies by Foreign Investors since 2005-12-31 (Effective). 
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institutional investors with professional and sophisticated investment knowledge and skills could enhance 
domestic investors’ participation and elicit more trades, thereby reducing real friction costs by spreading 
fixed real costs over more trades. Regarding the informational friction component of liquidity, a common 
argument is that foreign institutional investors are better informed and therefore regarded as informed 
traders. Market makers are concerned about the potential losses of trading against informed traders, 
leading them to increase spreads (an adverse selection effect). However, Stulz (1999a, b) argues that 
liquidity in the local financial market is likely to improve as a result of the better information disclosure 
and higher trading activity engendered by the participation of international financial institutions. When 
prices reflect better and more relevant information, market makers decrease spreads due to lower price 
uncertainty. 
This paper offers three distinct contributions. First, it is the first study to examine the relationship 
between foreign institutional investors and stock liquidity by using restricted foreign ownership rather 
than the unrestricted large foreign ownership commonly used in previous studies.5 Second, it is the first 
study to investigate how foreign institutional investors with different levels of ownership are related to 
stock liquidity.  Third, we use new measures to explore the channels (i.e., the real friction and the 
informational friction channels) through which foreign institutional participation is associated with stock 
market liquidity.  
Our paper finds, first, that market participation by foreign institutional investors is positively related to 
liquidity, indicated by a lower quoted spread and higher order book depth. This finding contrasts with the 
results of Rhee and Wang (2009), who document that foreign institutional ownership is positively 
associated with spreads while negatively related to order book depth on the Indonesian stock market. This 
interesting result differs from the literature: in the absence of large foreign ownership, foreign 
participation appears to contribute positively to liquidity. The finding that foreign institutional investors 
with large ownership in the A-share market are negatively associated with liquidity also supports the 
widely documented evidence in the literature. The second set of results shows that foreign institutional 
investors’ participation is positively related to market liquidity through the real friction channel rather than 
the information friction channel. This finding supports the argument that foreign institutional investors 
increase trading activity and decrease real friction cost. Finally, the results of a number of additional tests 
indicate that: (1) our results are robust to possible endogeneity and reverse causality associated with 
foreign ownership; (2) the relationship between QFII participation and liquidity remained stable and 
																																																								
5 The notion of restricted foreign ownership in China’s market is reflected in the limited foreign shareholding, 
investment quota and share of total market capitalization. The shareholding limit of all overseas investors is capped 
at 20%. The total overseas investors’ stake is also restricted by a quota, which increased from $10 billion to $30 
billion in 2007. Unlike other emerging markets in which foreign institutions held close to 40% of the total market 
capitalization (see Rhee and Wang, 2009 for the case of Indonesia), the total value held by foreign investors 




strong before and after the global financial crisis; (3) the link between QFII participation and liquidity 
occurs in both the Shanghai and the Shenzhen stock exchanges; and (4) our results are robust to 
controlling for industry effects. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops our hypotheses on the real friction 
channel, and the informational friction channel. Section 3 explains the measurement of liquidity and of the 
real and informational frictions for individual stocks: this section also develops the econometric 
specifications of our panel data regressions. Section 4 describes the study’s data sources and provides 
descriptive statistics for liquidity measures, firm characteristics, and ownership variables. Section 5 
reports the results of our main panel data regressions. Section 6 examines the endogeneity of foreign 
institutional ownership and causality.  Section 7 presents the results of various robustness checks. The 
final section summarizes the study and provides concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Hypothesis Development 
Previous studies discuss the liquidity effects of foreign institutions participating in the local stock 
market, but none explicitly identifies the channels through which this influence occurs. To this end, we 
follow Stoll (2000), who suggests decomposing total friction (such as quoted or effective spread) into real 
friction and informational friction. We disentangle real and informational effects by examining the impact 
of foreign institutional investors on the real costs of trading. These real friction effects are directly 
associated with the level of trading activity, such as average turnover, number of trades and trading 
volume. We then examine the impact of foreign institutional participation on market liquidity through the 
informational friction channel while controlling for the real friction effect. 
2.1.  Real friction channel 
Established literature argues that the presence of large shareholders could reduce the number of shares 
available to the public for trading, thus reducing stock liquidity by lowering trading activity (Demsetz, 
1968; Bolton and Thadden, 1998; Rubin, 2007; Brockman et al., 2009). Amihud and Mendelson (1986) 
further show that trading activity is negatively associated with the bid-ask spread thereby implying that the 
decline in trading activity would lead to a higher bid-ask spread. Several studies concerning the effect of 
foreign ownership on liquidity have reported a negative relationship between foreign ownership and 
liquidity, which could be caused by foreign investors “soaking up” the shares available to shareholders 
willing to trade them (Rhee and Wang, 2009; Ng et al., 2011; Prasanna and Bansal, 2014).  This is 
particularly true for foreign investors who are the major shareholders of a firm. Under the QFII scheme, 
however, foreign institutional investors are tightly restricted in their shareholding. As noted in our data 
description statistics in Table 1, foreign institutional ownership accounts for about 1.8% of a firm’s total 
shares under the QFII scheme. By the same token, this low foreign ownership is unlikely to result in 
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significantly less trading activity due to a reduction in the number of shares available to the public, despite 
the fact QFII investors are known to adopt a long-term, buy-and-hold strategy.   
Another important flaw in existing studies on the effect of foreign ownership on liquidity is that they 
neglect the effect on trading activity exerted by domestic investors due to the presence of foreign 
institutional investors. It is well documented that foreign institutional investors have superior insights and 
perform better than domestic investors when picking quality stocks, given the former’s superior 
experience, advanced knowledge, and greater investment sophistication (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000; 
Seasholes, 2004; Froot et al., 2001; Froot and Ramadorai, 2001). We believe that these advantages are 
more pronounced in developing countries, especially in a country like China, which suffers from a lack of 
informational transparency and is steeped in information asymmetries. The presence of foreign 
institutional investors is expected to provide benefits for local investors, particularly minority 
shareholders, by encouraging them to invest. In addition, the licensing process for QFIIs is rigorous and 
few licenses to invest are granted. Long-term foreign institutional investors such as mutual funds, insurers, 
pension funds, and sovereign wealth funds are more likely to qualify. In this respect, QFIIs are likely to be 
efficient processors of public information, and their professionalism and sophisticated investment skills 
are widely acknowledged by local investors. More importantly, their preference for investing in listed 
firms is likely to influence the investment preference of local investors. Accordingly, one would predict 
that QFIIs could promote liquidity by increasing local investors’ trading activity.  
Nonetheless, the liquidity effect through local investors’ trading activity due to the participation of 
foreign institutional investors is not as clear-cut in China. Some may argue that QFII investment is just a 
small portion of their global portfolio to the extent that they may not invest extensively or analyze the 
Chinese firms they invest in, particularly for a policy-driven market like China. Their investment therefore 
might not provide a good reference for local investors and may not induce local investors to trade actively 
in the financial market. This two-sided argument leads to the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: With higher foreign institutional ownership in a stock, the level of trading activity 
increases (or decrease), thereby reducing (increasing) the average transaction cost and promoting 
(dampening) liquidity. 
2.2.  Informational friction channel 
Generally, the effect of foreign institutional participation on information friction can be positive or 
negative. Many studies show that information drives institutional trading (Ali et al., 2004; Ke and Petroni, 
2004; Bushee and Goodman, 2007). However, it is possible that foreign institutional participation can give 
rise to greater transparency and corporate disclosure. According to Stulz (1999a, b), the participation of 
foreign institutional investors improves information disclosure and lowers price uncertainty. In China, 
great strides have been made over the last decade to improve corporate governance, accountability, and 
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transparency at both the state and firm level. Regulations mandating convergence toward IFRS 
(International Financial Reporting Standards), the use of IAAS (International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards), the presence of independent directors, and limits on insider trading activity, along with broad 
government disclosure reforms and significant anticorruption programs, have been implemented to 
improve China’s investing environment. It is well established that increased information availability 
improves the efficiency of resource allocation decisions. Subsequently, the participation of foreign 
institutional investors through their investment in the A-share market can generate greater incentives for 
better corporate governance and greater accountability and transparency, leading to significant benefits 
such as greater economic development, lower costs of capital and better-functioning capital markets. 
While the participation of foreign institutional investors can improve information disclosure, some 
studies argue to the contrary. As large institutional ownership increases information asymmetry (Dennis 
and Weston, 2001; Agarwal, 2007; Rubin, 2007; Brockman and Yan, 2009), foreign institutions are less 
likely to have a positive impact on liquidity. This is because foreign institutional investors are perceived to 
be better traders, being better informed (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000; Seasholes, 2004); they monitor 
corporate management better than local institutions (Khanna and Palepu, 2000); and they produce more 
timely and accurate forecasts than local analysts (Bachmann and Bolliger, 2001). Another possible reason 
for a negative impact of foreign institutional participation is that a shift in majority ownership to foreign 
institutions may weaken the informal information channels between the local government and industries in 
emerging markets, making the company appear “foreign” to local investors (Rhee and Wang, 2009). 
Based on the above arguments on the informational friction channel of foreign institutional investors’ 
effect on liquidity, the second hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Participation by foreign institutional investors operates through the information friction 
channel to increase (or decrease) liquidity. 
 
3.  Measurement of variables and model specifications 
Due to the latent nature of liquidity and its multiple dimensions, a single measure cannot capture all its 
features. We apply measures commonly used in the liquidity literature to reflect liquidity’s tightness and 
depth dimensions. We also apply different decompositions of the spread into an informational friction cost 
component and a real friction cost component. The control variables included in the panel data regressions 
are chosen mainly to conform to the literature. 
3.1.  Measurement of dependent variables 
(a) Liquidity 
The liquidity measures considered are the relative quoted bid-ask spread and market depth. The spread 
is a measure of tightness in the market, as it reflects the cost of an immediate round-trip trade of a stock. It 
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is also a measure of the total friction, as it summarizes the costs of a market maker (i.e., inventory cost, 
adverse selection cost, and operating fees). The relative quoted bid-ask spread (QS) is defined as the 
difference between ask and bid, scaled by the midpoint of the prevailing quote. We find that the majority 
of trades occur at the bid or ask and very few trades occur within or outside the spread. This is to be 
expected, given that China’s stock market is purely order-driven and operates through automated 
electronic trading systems. Consequently, there is no significant difference between the relative quoted 
spread and the relative effective spread.6 We calculate the daily quoted spread for each firm using intraday 
data as the average spread during each day (see Section 4.1 for a description of the data). The daily market 
depth (DEP) is calculated as the average during each day of the sum of the open volume at the bid side 
and the ask side at the first level of the order book.7 We then average the daily liquidity observations to 
obtain quarterly liquidity measures for each firm. 
 
(b) Spread decomposition 
First, following Barclay and Hendershott (2004) and Hendershott et al. (2011), we decompose the 
spread into the realized spread (RS) and the price impact (PI). The decomposition is based on price 
behavior subsequent to a transaction. It assumes that the informational component of trading costs leads to 
a permanent decrease (increase) in security value after sells (buys), while the non-informational 
component leads only to a temporary change in value. 
The advantage of using this decomposition is that it separates the informational component of the 
spread from its non-informational component. These two components can be directly identified with the 
two channels through which QFII ownership is potentially linked to liquidity—the informational friction 
channel versus the real friction channel. The price impact measures the gross losses to liquidity demanders 
due to adverse selection and thus it refers to informational frictions. The realized spread, correspondingly, 
measures the non-informational component of spread, which is associated with inventory and order 
processing costs, and thus refers to real frictions. 
We assume that the liquidity provider is able to close the position at the quote midpoint five minutes 
after the trade. The realized spread is then defined as8: 
, 	 , , , / , ,        (1) 
 
																																																								
6 The relative effective bid-ask spread is, on average, almost identical to the relative quoted bid-ask spread, both in 
level and variability. Accordingly, we find that the regression results are unchanged when we use the relative 
effective spread. 
7 As an alternative measure of order book depth, we consider the sum of the bid volume times the prevailing bid 
price and the ask volume times the prevailing ask price, with similar regression results. 
8 We also calculate the 30-minute realized spread and price impact, with similar regression results. 
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where ,  is the transaction price at time , ,  is the quote midpoint at time , ,  is the quote 
midpoint five minutes after time . ,  is an indicator of trade type at time  that takes the value of 1 if 
the trade is a buyer-initiated transaction and 1  if the trade is a seller-initiated transaction. 9 
Correspondingly, the five-minute price impact of a trade is defined as: 
 
, 	 , , , / , ,        (2) 
where , , ,  and ,  are defined as Eq. (1). Note that the sum of the realized spread and the price 
impact is equal to the effective half-spread: 
 
, , , / , , , , / , , , , / , ,             (3)                                               
(Effective half-spread = Realized spread + Price impact). 
 
We calculate the average daily realized spread and the average daily price impact of a trade for each firm 
using intraday data. We then average the daily measures over each quarter to obtain quarterly measures for 
each firm. 
Many studies suggest that real frictions are directly linked to the trading activity, such as the number 
of trades and trading volume (Demsetz, 1968; Stoll, 2000; Rubin, 2007; Brockman et al., 2009). 
Therefore, we examine how QFIIs’ stock market participation is associated with trading activity. We 
calculate two straightforward daily measures of trading activity:  firstly, the number of transactions (TRA) 
and secondly, the trading volume (TV). We average the daily trading activity observations to obtain 
quarterly measures of trading activity for each firm. Furthermore we estimate two alternative measures for 
the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread to isolate the informed trading component of the 
spread. The two methods used are proposed by Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) and Huang and Stoll 
(1997), which we hereafter denote “LSB” and “HS”, respectively. 
The LSB adverse selection spread component is estimated by the following firm-specific regression 
using intraday data: 
 
∆ , 	 , , , ,        (4) 
																																																								
9 We classify trades at prices above the prevailing quote midpoint as buyer-initiated trades ( , 1  and those 
below the midpoint as seller-initiated trades ( , 1 . In addition, we employ a tick test (Lee and Ready, 1991) if 
the trade price is equal to the prevailing quote midpoint. A tick test essentially involves assigning , 1 ( ,
1) for trades at a price higher (lower) than the trade price at time 1. 
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where  ∆ , , ,  is the change in the quote midpoint between time  and time 1 for firm 
, and ,  and ,  are defined as in Eq. (1). The estimate of the LSB adverse selection component is the 
regression coefficient . 
The adverse selection spread component in the model introduced by HS is estimated by the following 




, , ,         (5) 
 
where ∆ ,  and ,  are defined as in Eq. (4) and Eq. (1), respectively, and ,  and ,  are the 
quoted ask and bid prices at time . The estimate of the HS adverse selection component is the regression 
coefficient . Following HS, the estimate is interpreted as the combination of the adverse selection 
component and inventory holding cost component of the spread. 
The weakness of these two measures for the adverse selection component of the spread is that LSB 
assume inventory costs are negligible, and HS do not separate the adverse selection component from the 
inventory component. In addition, estimation errors can be introduced into the estimations if the 
underlying model is not correctly specified. We calculate the average daily adverse selection components 
for each firm using intraday data. We then average the daily estimates over all trading days each quarter to 
obtain quarterly measures for each firm. 
 
3.2.  Measurement of control variables 
Previous studies indicate that firm size, stock price volatility, share price, and turnover are associated 
with liquidity (Benston and Hagerman, 1974; Stoll and Whaley, 1983; Agarwal, 2007; Brockman et al., 
2009). For firm size, Stoll and Whaley (1983) argue that trading smaller stocks is more expensive because 
less relevant information about these firms is available. According to Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam 
(2001), volatility increases the market makers’ inventory risk and the risk of unintentionally engaging in 
short-term speculative trades. Previous studies show that the spread could be correlated with price non-
linearly; hence, it is standard practice to take the natural logarithm of share price (Brockman et al., 2009; 
Chung et al., 2010). Agarwal (2007) argues that high turnover may reflect belief dispersion induced by 
information differences among investors. In our panel data regressions, we control for these effects by 
including stock return volatility (VOL) estimated by the standard deviation of daily stock returns, firm size 
measured by the book value of a firm (SIZE), the natural logarithm of the share price (LNP), and the 
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turnover rate (TO) as explanatory variables.10,11 In addition, the degree of leverage (LEV) is included 
because the security design literature has recognized that a firm’s capital structure can affect the degree of 
information disclosure (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Consequently, the capital structure can be 
associated with market liquidity through the informational channel. We also control for ownership by 
domestic institutional investors (DI) by including the percentage ownership of the five largest domestic 
institutions (i.e., open-end funds, security, insurance, trust companies, and pension funds). 
Finally, we include two control variables unique to China’s stock market: a state-owned enterprise 
dummy (STATE) and the non-tradable share ratio (NT). China’s stock market is characterized by the 
dominance of state-owned enterprises, and previous studies find that whether a firm is state-owned does 
matter for stock liquidity due to its links to the government (Chu et al., 2014; Ding, 2014). Therefore, we 
control for SOE dummy as a proxy for political connections, by defining a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 if a firm is state-owned and 0 if otherwise. To improve the structure of corporate governance 
and market liquidity, a split-share structure reform was introduced by the Chinese government in 2005 to 
dismantle the dual-share structure by converting non-tradable shares into tradable shares. Before the 
reform, the split-share structure and the associated overhang of the non-tradable shares presumably 
impaired liquidity (Jiang et al., 2008; Beltratti et al., 2012). We use a firm’s non-tradable share ratio (i.e., 
the number of non-tradable shares divided by the total number of shares) to control for the split-share 
structure. Many explanatory variables are available only on a quarterly basis; we measure these variables 
in the beginning of each quarter (indicated by subscript 1 in the regression). The remaining variables 
are measured as the average over each quarter (indicated by subscript  in the regression). 
3.3.  Specification of panel regression models 
Eq. (6) specifies the panel data model for examining the relationship between the QFII participation 
and stock market liquidity, defined as tightness and depth. The dependent variable measuring tightness is 
the relative quoted spread (QS). The dependent variable measuring depth is the sum of the open volume at 
the bid side and ask side at the first level of the order book (DEP). All liquidity measures are calculated 
using intraday trade and quote data (see Section 4.1). 
																																																								
10 China’s stock market consists of A-shares, B-shares and overseas shares: consequently, market capitalization is 
partially determined by the B-shares and overseas shares markets. However, we focus only on the A-share market. 
Therefore to remove cross-market effects, we use the book value of a firm instead of market capitalization as a proxy 
for size. Most of the shares in the listed firms were not tradable in the secondary stock market before the split-share 
structure reform, which suggests that market capitalization based on tradable shares is not a good proxy for firm size. 
Nonetheless we also estimate the regression using market capitalization with similar results. 
11 Following Heflin and Shaw (2000) and Brockman, Chung, and Yan (2009), we use the number of trades or trading 
volume as a control variable instead of turnover. Additionally, we run the panel regressions with the reciprocal of  




We follow Rubin (2007), Brockman et al. (2009) and Chung et al. (2010) and estimate the following 
main panel regression for firm  and time : 
 
, , , , , ,  
														 , , , , ∑ , ,   (6) 
 
where LIQ QS	or	DEP,	and	QFII is the percentage ownership by qualified foreign institutional investors. 
Due to the high skewness and kurtosis, we transform all dependent variables by taking the natural 
logarithm. The control variables, namely domestic institutional ownership (DI), firm size (SIZE), SOE 
dummy (STATE), leverage ratio (LEV), stock return volatility (VOL), logarithm of share price (LNP), 
stock turnover rate (TO), and the non-tradable share ratio (NT), are measured as described in Section 3.2. 
The quarterly time dummies (D) capture common shocks and potential time trends. For each measure of 
liquidity, we run two panel regressions. The first regression has QFII ownership as an explanatory 
variable, and the second has both QFII ownership and domestic institutional ownership as explanatory 
variables (all regressions include the remaining control variables). If QFII ownership is positively related 
to liquidity, the coefficient on QFII should have a negative sign for the spread and a positive sign for the 
measure of market depth. 
We next ask whether the relationship between the participation of foreign institutional investors and 
liquidity operates through the real friction channel or through the informational friction channel. In these 
regressions, the dependent variables are instead the realized spread (RS), the price impact (PI), the trading 
activity (TRA and TV), and the alternative measures for the adverse selection costs (LSB and HS). The 
explanatory variables are the same as in the panel regression in Eq. (6).12 If QFII ownership is positively 
associated with liquidity through the real friction channel, the coefficient on QFII should have a negative 
sign for the realized spread and a positive sign for the trading activity. If the QFII ownership is positively 
associated with liquidity through the informational friction channel, the coefficient on QFII should have a 
negative sign for the measures of adverse selection costs. 
All panel regressions are fitted to quarterly unbalanced pooled panel data, with the number of time-
series observations varying from 4 to 32 quarters. The cross-section includes 1,939 firms in total. A 
specific feature of our dataset is that it has a large number of firms with relatively few time-series 
observations. Consequently, it is important to recognize the effects of cross-sectional correlation among 
firms and serial correlation across time. To address these issues, we employ the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) 
																																																								
12 When the dependent variable is a measure of trading activity, turnover rate is not included as a control variable.	
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and Hoechle (2007) nonparametric covariance matrix estimator for unbalanced panels, which is robust to 
different forms of spatial and temporal dependences.13 
4.  Data 
4.1     Data sources and data filtering 
Trade and quote data are collected from the Thomson Reuters tick history distributed by Sirca. To 
ensure the integrity of the database, the analysis is confined to transactions coded as regular trades and 
quotes that are best bid or offer (BBO) eligible. Trades and quotes are time-stamped to the second, and we 
assume no reporting delay and make no time adjustment.14 We filter the trade and quote data following the 
standard microstructure literature.15 The sample includes all stocks listed on the Shanghai (SHSE) and 
Shenzhen (SZSE) stock exchanges from the beginning of July 2004 to the end of March 2012. The SHSE 
and SZSE in China are purely order-driven markets, both of which run electronic automated trading 
systems. The two stock exchanges open with a call market and operate as a continuous market for the 
remainder of the trading day. To avoid contaminating the data with different trading structures, we do not 
use data before the exchanges open or after they close. 
We exclude stocks listed for fewer than 100 days, as well as those from financial industries.  
Outstanding shares include A-shares, B-shares, H-shares, and other negotiable overseas shares. We adjust 
the sample by considering firms only listed in the A-share market. We focus on the A-share market 
because: (1) the scale of the A-share market is much larger than that of the other markets, (2) the trade 
data for the listed firms come from the A-share market, and (3) this focus allows us to mitigate the 
problem of the cross-market effects of institutional holdings arising from market microstructure 
differences. These exclusions leave us with a sample of 1,939 firms. 
The China Center for Economic Research (CCER) database provides daily data on closing price, 
trading volume, share turnover, total number of shares, number of non-tradable shares, number of A-
shares, and quarterly data on total liabilities, total assets, long-term debt, total shareholder equity, firm 
age, top 10 ownership concentration measured by the Herfindahl 10 index, and the information used to 
																																																								
13 More specifically, Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are robust to very general residual correlation, both within a firm 
over time and across firms in the same period and between different periods. We specify a maximum lag of one in 
the autocorrelation structure to control for the persistence in firm liquidity over time. None of the results are 
significantly changed if we instead specify a maximum lag of two or three. 
14 We also follow Lee and Ready (1991), who suggest identifying a quote as prevailing at the time of the transaction 
if it was the latest quote for the stock and was at least five seconds old: the results are qualitatively unchanged. 
15 See, for example, HS for a description of common filtering procedures. We apply the following filters: (1) delete 
quotes if either the bid or ask price is negative; (2) delete quotes if either the bid or ask size is negative; (3) delete 
quotes if the bid-ask spread is greater than 25% of the transaction price or is negative; (4) delete trades and quotes if 
they are out of sequence temporally; (5) delete trades if the price or volume is negative; and (6) delete trades and 
quotes if they changed by more than 10% compared to the last transaction price and quote.	
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identify a firm as state-owned (or not).16 We winsorize the leverage at the 99% level to remove the effect 
of outliers.17  
We obtain the total number of shares held by QFIIs from the CCER. Additionally, CCER provides us 
with the total number of shares held by the five largest domestic institutions (open-end funds, security, 
insurance, trust companies, and pension funds) among the top 10 outstanding shareholders. The data on 
QFIIs and the five largest domestic institutions are widely used and closely monitored by the press, 
investors and the general public. Institutional investment strategies are considered to be of significant 
interest to the public, as are data on total holding shares, purchases, and sales by large institutions. These 
data are released on a quarterly basis to the public because all listed companies must report their top 10 
outstanding shareholders to the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). However, every QFII 
is obliged to report holding information in each individual firm to the CSRC on a quarterly basis, allowing 
us to obtain the aggregate QFIIs shareholding in each firm. 
Foreign institutional investors in China can invest in A-shares through the QFII and other policies. 
Under the relevant law and administrative regulations, holdings are capped at 20% (10%) for all (a single) 
QFIIs in any listed company in the A-share market, but they are not restricted in trading. However, to 
improve firm performance and corporate governance, the Chinese government employs other policies to 
attract large foreign investment.18 For example, according to the measures for the so-called “strategic 
investments” in listed companies by foreign investors, a foreign entity is required to have an equity 
interest of at least 10% at initial investment with a holding period of more than three years. Accordingly, 
foreign ownership pursuant to policies related to long-term strategic firm investment is expected to be 
much greater than QFII ownership but more restricted in secondary market trading. Since foreign strategic 
investors are more likely to be large shareholders in a firm, the aggregate foreign holding among the top 
10 shareholders, deducting QFII ownership, is a good proxy for the holdings of strategic foreign 
institutional ownership. We can use this information to compare the liquidity links to larger (strategic) and 
smaller (QFIIs) foreign institutional investors. 
4.2.  Descriptive statistics and preliminary analysis 
																																																								
16 This database is produced and maintained by the Pacific-Basin Capital Markets (PACAP) Research Center of the 
College of Business Administration at the University of Rhode Island and the SinoFin Information Services affiliated 
with the China Center for Economic Research, Peking University. 
17 Because the variables analyzed have uncontroversial minimum values, we do not winsorize at the 1% level. 
18 China’s relevant authorities such as the China’s Securities Regulatory Commission, have so far released the Notice 
of the Relevant Issues concerning the Transfer of State-Owned Shares and Corporate Shares of Listed Companies to 
Foreign Investors since 2002-11-01 (Expired); Interim Provisions for Foreign Investors to Merge Domestic 
Enterprises since 2003-03-07 (Revised); Decision of the Ministry of Commerce on Amending the Provisions on the 
Merger or Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors since 2009-06-22 (Effective); and the Measures 




In this section, we present the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables, foreign and domestic 
institutional ownership variables, and control variables. We proceed to a preliminary univariate analysis 
comparing firms with participating foreign institutional investors and firms without participating foreign 
institutional investors in terms of differences in the quoted spread, market depth, realized spread, price 
impact, alternative measures for the adverse selection component, and trading activity. 
4.2.1.  Summary statistics 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in this study.  We see that, on average, 
QFIIs hold approximately 1.795% of a firm’s outstanding shares, while domestic institutions, in 
aggregate, hold approximately 6.285% (open-end funds, security, insurance, trust companies, and pension 
funds). Interestingly, we find that the average foreign ownership from other policies is approximately 15% 
and much larger than the average QFII ownership. The 95% ownership quantiles illustrate the same 
observation: approximately 46% for strategic investors and approximately 4.5% for QFIIs. The average 
relative quoted spread is approximately 0.201%. For market depth, the mean is 70,099 shares per day. The 
average price impact is 0.036% while the average realized spread is 0.067%. The sum of these two 
components is equal to the effective half-spread. This suggests that the adverse selection (information 
frictions) component occupies approximately 35% of the spread, while non-informational component (real 
frictions) occupies approximately 65% of the spread.  
The median adverse selection component based on the HS measure is 0.291, while the median adverse 
selection component using LSB is 0.307, indicating that the adverse selection component based on these 
two measures is approximately 30% of the spread, which is remarkably similar to the price impact 
measure. Regarding trading activity, the average daily number of trades is 2,807, while the average daily 
trading volume is 7.156 million shares. Furthermore, the average book value of firm size is approximately 
2.197 billion yuan, the average return volatility expressed per quarter is 30.532%, the average non-
tradable share ratio is 0.396, the average leverage ratio is 0.486, the average firm age is 12 years, the 
average return on assets is 0.031% and the average Herfindahl 10 index is 0.156. The two liquidity 
measures—the realized spread and the price impact—and the other two measures for the adverse selection 
component based on LSB and HS exhibit large positive skewness and excess kurtosis. The same holds 
true for the two measures of trading activity—market capitalization and volatility. In view of this, we 
apply the natural logarithm transformation to these variables. 
[ Table 1 about here ] 
4.2.2.  Preliminary univariate analysis 
To provide a visual impression of the dynamic relationship between liquidity and ownership, we plot 
the total value of QFIIs’ share holdings each quarter and the two average quarterly liquidity measures, the 
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relative quoted bid-ask spread (Panel A) and market depth (Panel B), as seen in Figure 1.19 The left 
vertical axis shows QFII participation (share holdings), and the right vertical axis shows liquidity over the 
sample period (2004Q3 to 2012Q1). The visual evidence in Figure 1 suggests a negative relationship 
between the participation of QFIIs and market illiquidity over time. 
[ Figure 1 about here ] 
We perform preliminary univariate tests on the two liquidity measures, the three measures for the 
adverse selection component, the realized spread and the two trading activity measures for two sub-
samples of firms: those with QFIIs and those without (non-QFII firms). We assume that, if QFII 
participation reduces total frictions, the real friction or the informational friction, we expect to find 
different (average) values of the various measures for the two groups of firms. The evidence in Table 2 
indeed suggests that this is the case, and all differences are statistically significant at the 5% level. We find 
that the average relative quoted spread is 0.161% for non-QFII firms, which is lower than that of QFII 
firms (0.205%). The price impact and realized spread are also lower for QFII firms (0.027% and 0.038%, 
respectively), compared to 0.038% and 0.068% for non-QFII firms. The two measures for the adverse 
selection component based on LSB and HS exhibit the same pattern. 
[ Table 2 about here ] 
Similarly, the quoted depth is higher for QFII firms, at 75,571 shares, than for non-QFII firms, at 
69,794 shares. The two measures of trading activity are both higher for QFII firms than non-QFII firms, at 
9.819 million shares per day (3,595 trades) compared to 6.853 million shares per day (2,718 trades), 
respectively. 
 
5.  Empirical results 
We begin our empirical analysis by investigating whether foreign institutional investors (QFIIs) are 
associated with liquidity on the Chinese stock market using the panel regression in Eq. (6). Next, we 
analyze whether there is a relationship between the foreign institutional ownership and stock market 
liquidity through the real friction channel or through the informational friction channel. In the following 
section, we include large ownership by strategic foreign institutional investors as an additional 
explanatory variable in addition to QFII ownership to differentiate the link to liquidity between 
institutions with smaller and larger investments.  
5.1.  Foreign institutional ownership and stock market liquidity 
Table 3 shows the results of the first panel data regressions. Our focus is on the link between 
foreign institutional ownership and market tightness and market depth, respectively. The first two 
																																																								
19 We aggregate all foreign institutional holdings across firms for each quarter. 
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regressions (columns) show the results for the relative quoted spread. We find clear evidence that 
increased foreign institutional ownership is associated with a lower quoted spread. The inclusion of 
domestic institutions in the regressions does not alter the relationship between foreign institutional 
ownership and the relative quoted spread. The coefficient estimate on foreign institutional ownership 
(QFII) is statistically highly significant and stable at -0.588 and -0.616 in the two regressions. The 
numerical magnitudes of the coefficient estimates indicate that a 10% higher foreign institutional 
ownership is associated with an approximately 6% lower spread. Rhee and Wang (2009) find contrary 
results for the Indonesian stock market, where a 10% increase in foreign institutional ownership is related 
to an approximately 2% increase in the spread. Similarly, for the Indian stock market, Prasanna and 
Bansal (2014) conclude that a 10% increase in gross purchases by foreign investors is associated with a 
1% increase in the spread. An explanation for the contrasting results is that foreign ownership is much 
greater on these markets than for QFIIs on the Chinese markets. 
These results are consistent with the view that there is a non-monotonic relationship between 
institutional ownership and liquidity. Agarwal (2007) argues that, for lower levels of institutional 
ownership (as for QFIIs) a price discovery effect prevails: when better informed foreign institutions trade, 
prices reflect more relevant information, which leads to narrower spreads. For higher levels of institutional 
ownership (as in Indonesia and India), an adverse selection effect prevails: the risk of trading with an 
informed investor is higher, which leads to wider spreads. Another possible explanation is that the 
activities in a stock of foreign institutions are closely monitored and regarded as having a value as a 
signal. It is therefore associated with the increased trading activity of other investors in addition to the 
trading of the QFIIs themselves.  
[ Table 3 about here ] 
The next two regressions show the results for market depth (with and without domestic 
institutional ownership as a control). The dependent variable measuring depth is the sum of open volume 
at the bid side and the ask side at the first level of the order book. Our evidence shows that foreign 
institutional ownership is significantly and positively related to order book depth, with coefficient 
estimates 1.021 and 1.005 (i.e., foreign institutional ownership is again linked to a higher liquidity, as with 
the spread). The numerical magnitude of the coefficient estimate indicates that a 10% increase in foreign 
institutional ownership is associated with an approximately 10% increase in the order book depth. This 
result again contrasts with that of Rhee and Wang (2009), who find that increased foreign institutional 
ownership is associated with a decline in the order book depth on the Indonesian stock market. We make 
considerable efforts below to discover which explanation for our results on spreads and depths is more 
likely in the Chinese context. 
Turning to control variables and the coefficient for domestic institutional ownership (DI), the 
results are reversed in the spread regressions. We find that an increased domestic institutional ownership 
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is associated with an increased quoted relative spread. The coefficient estimate on domestic institutional 
ownership is statistically highly significant and equal to 0.329. This numerical magnitude of the 
coefficient estimate indicates that a 10% increase in domestic institutional ownership is associated with an 
approximately 3% higher spread. This result is in line with the view that large institutional ownership with 
inactive trading decreases the number of free-float shares available to other investors, thereby increasing 
the real friction costs. A possible alternative explanation for this finding is that domestic institutional 
investors possess private, value-relevant information and trade on it, thereby increasing adverse selection 
costs. We also find that increased domestic institutional ownership is associated with a decrease in market 
depth for individual firms, but the coefficient estimates are not statistically significant. 
The coefficient estimates on the remaining control variables suggest that firm size, share price, and 
turnover rate correlate strongly with the spread of individual firms. Briefly, smaller firm size, lower share 
price, and lower turnover rate are associated with a higher spread. In addition, larger firms and firms with 
higher leverage ratio, lower share price and higher turnover rate have higher order book depth. These 
results are broadly consistent with previous literature for the US stock market (see, e.g., Benston and 
Hagerman, 1974; Stoll and Whaley, 1983; Agarwal, 2007; Brockman, Chung, and Yan, 2009). 
Interestingly, the control variable indicating whether a firm is state-owned is highly significant in all 
regressions with the expected signs, and the state-owned firms have smaller spreads and greater order 
book depth. This is in line with the view espoused by Ding and Suardi (2015) who states that a major state 
shareholder in a firm indicates government confidence in it and serves as a more efficient monitor than a 
non-state shareholder. It can not only enhance investors’ willingness to invest and trade in this stock but 
also enhance the firm’s corporate governance, thereby improving liquidity by increasing trading activity 
and informational efficiency in the market.  Finally, firms with a higher ratio of non-tradable shares are 
associated with lower liquidity, indicated by higher quoted spread and lower order book depth. This 
occurs because the presence of non-tradable shares not only reduces the number of shares available to the 
public but also increases the information asymmetries between the majority and minority shareholders due 
to a conflict of interest between non-tradable and tradable shareholders,20 resulting in lower liquidity. 
5.2.  Real friction channel and informational friction channel 
We now seek to determine whether it is more likely that the link between the participation of foreign 
institutional investors and liquidity operates through the real friction channel or through the informational 
friction channel. As explained in Section 3.1, we decompose the effective half-spread into the realized 
spread and price impact, of which the former is related to the real friction channel and the latter is related 
to the informational friction channel. Columns (1) and (4) in Table 4 show the results of regressing the 
realized spread and the price impact on similar explanatory variables as in the panel regression in Eq. (6). 
																																																								
20 See, for example, Jensen and Meckling (1976), Allen et al. (2005) and Deng et al. (2008).	
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Our first result is that foreign institutional ownership is significantly negatively linked to the realized 
spread (RS), suggesting that the participation of foreign institutional investors reduces real friction costs 
such as inventory and order processing costs. Furthermore, many studies suggest that these real friction 
effects are directly associated with the level of trading activity, such as number of trades and trading 
volume (Demsetz, 1968; Rubin, 2007; Brockman et al., 2009). Therefore, we next examine whether the 
reduced real frictions are related to higher trading activity, measured as the number of trades (TRA) and 
the trading volume (TV). Columns (2) and (3) in Table 4 show the results. We find that higher foreign 
institutional ownership is positively linked to trading activity. Taken together, these results support our 
first hypothesis: with higher foreign institutional ownership in a stock, the level of trading activity 
increases, thereby reducing the average transaction and promoting liquidity. 
We find no evidence that foreign institutional ownership is significantly associated with the price 
impact (PI), a proxy for the informational frictions, suggesting that QFII participation in the Chinese stock 
market does not alter a firm’s informational environment. Neither does this result support the view that the 
participation of foreign institutional investors increases the degree of information asymmetry between 
liquidity suppliers and informed traders. The results from the two alternative measures of the adverse 
selection component (LSB and HS), reported in columns (5) and (6) in Table 4, are consistent with the 
result for the price impact, which strengthens our finding that the positive relationship between QFII 
participation and liquidity is mainly driven by the reduced real frictions due to increased trading activity. 
Taken together, these results fail to support our second hypothesis—participation by foreign institutional 
investors operates through information frictions to affect liquidity. This result is intuitive insofar as the 
QFIIs program restricts the share holdings of foreign institutional investors, which prevents the supposed 
influence on the firm’s corporate governance; hence the widely alleged amplification of information 
asymmetry associated with foreign participation is absent. Neither is it true that the majority ownership is 
shifted to foreign institutions, making the company “foreign” to local investors and reducing liquidity 
(Rhee and Wang, 2009).  
For the participation of domestic institutional investors, the overall evidence suggests that the negative 
association with the spread operates through both the real friction channel and the informational friction 
channel, although the results are weaker for the trading volume and the two measures for the adverse 
selection (LSB and HS). 
    [ Table 4 about here ] 
In line with expectations, firm size is positively related to trading activity and negatively related to 
both the real friction and adverse selection costs. We also find that the real friction and adverse selection 
costs are significantly lower when a firm is state-owned or has a lower non-tradable share ratio. These 
results are consistent with the results and explanations presented in section 5.2. 
5.3.  QFII ownership and large strategic foreign ownership 
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Apart from QFIIs, foreign investors in China can also invest in A-shares through other policies, and 
those strategic foreign investors commonly buy larger stakes in a stock than QFIIs. Although QFIIs have 
fewer restrictions on trading in the market, both investors tend to use buy-and-hold strategies and are 
perceived as rather inactive traders. Our previous results suggest that QFII participation in one stock 
increases other investors’ willingness to invest and trade in the same stock, thereby increasing trading 
activity. Accordingly, assuming that investment strategies from both types of foreign investors are closely 
watched by domestic investors, China’s A-share market provides us with an interesting setting for 
examining the potentially differential effect on liquidity from smaller foreign ownership (QFIIs) and 
larger strategic foreign ownership. Doing so may allow us to reconcile the positive association of foreign 
ownership found in this study with its negative association previously documented in the literature. 
Accordingly, we add one more variable to the panel regression in Eq. (6) —the aggregate foreign 
ownership through other policies (FLO). Table 5 presents the results from this regression. Consistent with 
our previous findings, we conclude that QFIIs are positively associated with liquidity. By contrast, we 
discover a negative relationship between FLOs and liquidity, manifested as a larger quoted spread and a 
lower order book depth. This finding is in line with studies on markets with a large foreign ownership 
(Rhee and Wang, 2009; Prasanna and Bansal, 2014) and consistent with the view that large foreign 
ownership with inactive trading decreases the number of free-float shares to the public, thereby increasing 
the real friction cost. This view is also supported by the significantly positive relationship between FLOs 
and the realized spread. Therefore, if FLOs increase the trading activity of other investors, this positive 
effect on trading activity is dominated by the negative effect from their inactive trading. Similar to our 
results for QFIIs, we find no significant result for the association between FLOs and price impact. This 
finding suggests that large foreign institutional investors do not increase informational friction costs on the 
Chinese market. This result is, however, not consistent with the view of Agarwal (2007) and Rhee and 
Wang (2009), who argue that large institutional owners increase the risk of trading with an informed 
investor, thereby increasing adverse selection costs.  
Taken together, this section provides a comparison between two levels of foreign ownership (QFIIs 
and large strategic investors) to reconcile the contrasting results in our study and the previous literature. 
We argue that the strong and dominant negative effect from large foreign ownership can easily negate the 
positive effect of foreign ownership on liquidity in emerging markets, which may lead to a 
misinterpretation of the relationship between foreign ownership and liquidity. The results in this section 
strengthen our view that the participation of foreign institutional investors can increase trading activity by 
increasing other investors’ willingness to trade. 
[ Table 5 about here ] 
 
6.  Reverse causality and the endogeneity of foreign institutional ownership 
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An alternative explanation for the positive relationship between QFII ownership and liquidity is that 
QFIIs are more likely to select liquid stocks, which can result in reverse causality. Therefore, in this 
section we investigate the issues of reverse causality and endogeneity in an attempt to reduce this concern. 
6.1.  Reverse causality test 
We employ Granger causality tests to identify the lead–lag relationship between QFII ownership and 
liquidity. We use our two liquidity measures, the quoted spread (QS) and the order book depth (DEP), to 
examine whether QFII ownership leads liquidity, or vice versa. To be consistent with our main analysis, 
we use the level of both the liquidity and ownership variables in the Granger causality test.21 In addition, 
we follow the standard practice of restricting the lag lengths of the QFII ownership and the liquidity 
measures to be equal. We apply five different lag specifications, from one lag up to five lags, for the 
liquidity and the ownership variables to account for serial correlation in the residuals. The control 
variables are the same as those in Eq. (6).22  We include time-fixed effects for each quarter to account for 
time trends in both the liquidity measures and QFII ownership. We run pooled OLS regressions separately 
on each equation with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) and Hoechle (2007) standard errors. Since we include 
time-fixed effects in both equations, the correlation between error terms from the two equations should be 
small, confirming that OLS is efficient in this case. The regressions are: 
, ∑ , ∑ , , ,             (7) 
, ∑ , ∑ , , , ,        (8) 
where LIQ QS	or	DEP,	and X is a shorthand notation for the control variables with the corresponding 
coefficient vectors  and . 
To examine if QFII ownership (Granger) causes liquidity, we test the joint hypothesis …
0 using an F-test. Similarly, to examine if liquidity (Granger) causes QFII ownership, we test the 
joint hypothesis … 0. The results are shown in Table 6. 
[Table 6 about here] 
We clearly reject both the hypothesis that QFII ownership does not (Granger) cause the quoted spread 
and the hypothesis that QFII ownership does not (Granger) cause the order book depth for all lag orders, 
based on the p-values from the F-tests (all p-values are below 5%). By contrast, we fail to reject the 
hypothesis that the quoted spread and the order book depth do not (Granger) cause QFII ownership (for all 
lag orders). Therefore, the results strongly indicate that QFII ownership affects liquidity, but there is no 
																																																								
21 We find that both QFII ownership and liquidity measures are trend stationary by using a Fisher-type unit-root test, 
which works well with unbalanced panel. The same result is found when we use the ADF unit root test and Phillips–
Perron unit-root test. 
22 Including higher order lags of the control variables does not change the results. 
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statistical evidence suggesting that liquidity affects QFII ownership. One possible reason for the lack of 
evidence of reverse causality is that QFII are interested in the long-term performance of firms, their book 
market value and profitability, to the extent that they tend to adopt a buy-and-hold stocks strategy and 
trade them infrequently.  
6.2.  Endogeneity test 
We perform an endogeneity test developed by Wu (1973) and Hausman (1978) to examine whether 
the QFII ownership or the liquidity variables, the quoted spread (QS) and the order book depth (DEP), are 
endogenous. We conduct two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions, where the first stage regression 
includes the same control variables as in Eq. (6), together with a set of new explanatory variables. We rely 
upon previous work on the investment preferences of foreign funds by Kang and Stulz (1997), Heflin and 
Shaw (2000), Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001), Rubin (2007), and Liu et al. (2012) and use the following 
additional explanatory variables in the first stage regression: the return on assets (net profit divided by 
total assets, ROA), the firm age (AGE), and an ownership concentration index, the Herfindahl 10 index 
(OC).23 We also include industry fixed effect dummies (IND) that are equal to 1 if the firm operates in a 
given industry and 0 if otherwise.24 The first stage regression is: 
, , , , ,  
																 , , , , , ∑   
																 , , , ∑ , , , .    (9) 
 
The second stage estimates the baseline regression in Eq. (6) by replacing the actual QFII holding 
with its lagged residual value (R_QFII) from the first stage regression. If QFII is endogenous, the 
coefficient on R_QFII in the second stage regression is statistically different from zero; if QFII is not 
endogenous, the coefficient is not statistically different from zero. The results are shown in Table 7. 
[ Table 7 about here ] 
We find that the coefficient estimates on R_QFII, in column (2) for the quoted spread and in column 
(4) for the order book depth, are not statistically different from zero. These results suggest that our 
findings about the relationship between the QFII ownership and liquidity do not suffer from endogeneity 
bias. 
6.3.  First difference model 
																																																								
23 The Herfindahl 10 index measures the degree of ownership dispersion in the top 10 shareholder structure.	
24 The industry classification is released by the CSRC, and the data are provided in the CCER database. There are 13 
different industries at the level of classification used in Eq. (9). 
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We estimated the panel model in Eq. (6) in first difference form and results are reported in Table 8. We 
find that the change in foreign ownership is significantly negatively associated with the change of the 
quoted spread, while the change in foreign ownership is significantly positively associated with the change 
in order book depth. When the spread is decomposed into the realized spread and price impact, the 
findings reveal that the association between the change in foreign ownership and change in realized spread 
is significantly negative. However, consistent with the results for the level of the price impact, there is no 
significant association between the change in foreign ownership and change in the price impact. These 
results strengthen our previous finding that the positive relationship between foreign institutional 
ownership and liquidity is mainly driven by reduced real frictions due to increased trading activity in 
stocks in which QFIIs invest. 
[ Table 8 about here ] 
The magnitude of the estimated coefficients of the change in foreign ownership on the change of the 
quoted spread, order book depth, and realized spread are smaller compared to the estimations in levels for 
the same variables. The economic implication is that foreign institutions’ shorter-term net purchases have 
a much smaller impact on liquidity than changes in their longer-term holdings, which are presumably 
governed by their longer-term strategic requirements. However, the levels of statistical significance for the 
quoted spread, order book depth, and realized spread in the first difference regressions are much reduced 
as well. Even though our first difference regression results are consistent with our level regression results, 
a plausible interpretation of the reduced magnitude and statistical significance is that QFII ownership for 
many firms displays only limited variation over time but varies substantially across firms. Taking first 
differences, then, substantially reduces the cross-sectional variation and leaves only shorter-term time-
series information with which to identify the coefficients of interest in the econometric model. A related 
problem with the first difference model in our setting is the fact that the state-ownership dummy is time-
invariant for many firms. The lack of information makes the coefficient on the change in the state-
ownership dummy variable difficult to identify, resulting in both a small and insignificant coefficient 
estimate. 
6.4.  Fixed effects model 
Unobservable time-invariant factors may simultaneously affect both the left-hand side and the right-
hand side of the regression in Eq. (6). If so, the regression can suffer from omitted variable bias. We 
estimate a firm fixed effects regression in an attempt to control for possible omitted variables. We report 
the results of the firm fixed effects regression with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) and Hoechle (2007) 
standard errors in Table 9. 
[ Table 9 about here ] 
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We find that the positive relationship between the QFII ownership and liquidity measures (the quoted 
spread and the order book depth) is not altered when the fixed effects model is applied. The same 
conclusion holds for the two components of the spread (i.e. realized spread and price impact): ownership 
is significantly negatively related to the realized spread but there is no significant relationship for the price 
impact. The magnitude and significance of the coefficient estimates are higher than in the first difference 
estimation but lower than in the original estimation. This is not surprising since the fixed effects 
transformation - as with the first difference transformation - removes cross-sectional variation in variables 
that display only a limited time-series variation. The results for the fixed effects estimation nonetheless 
again strengthen our previous finding that the positive relationship between foreign institutional 
ownership and liquidity is mainly driven by reduced real frictions due to increased trading activity in 
stocks in which QFIIs invest. 
 
7.  Additional robustness checks 
We estimate three alternative specifications of the panel regression in Eq. (6). First, the sample is 
divided into two sub-periods: 2004Q3 to 2007Q4 and 2008Q1 to 2012Q4. Second, we divide the sample 
into firms listed on the Shanghai exchange and the Shenzhen exchange. Third, we investigate whether 
including industry effects influence our previous results. 
7.1.  Influence of the global financial crisis 
Like many developing countries, China has enjoyed a booming stock market, for example when the 
CSI 300 index increased five-fold between 2005 and 2007 (see Figure 2). However, the Chinese stock 
market was not immune to the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-2008. The stock market in China 
essentially crashed, and more than two-thirds of the CSI 300 index value was wiped out during the period 
between October 2007 and December 2008. Furthermore, the total value of foreign institutional holdings 
dropped quite dramatically from the beginning of 2008 until the end of that year, before again increasing 
to pre-crisis levels in the second half of 2009. Based on the changing behavior of foreign institutions at the 
beginning of 2008, presumably caused by the GFC, we perform a sub-period analysis using the panel 
regression in Eq. (6) to investigate whether the link between QFII ownership and liquidity has changed 
over time, by dividing the sample into two sub-samples: sample 1, defined as the period 2004Q3-2007Q4, 
and sample 2, defined as the period 2008Q1-2012Q1.  The results are reported in Table 10. 
[ Figure 2 about here ] 
[ Table 10 about here ] 
We find that the association between the participation of QFIIs and liquidity remains strong before 
and after the GFC, yielding a negative link between ownership and spreads and a positive link between 
ownership and quoted depth. The coefficients for the quoted spread are statistically significant in both 
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sub-samples. The coefficient estimates for order book depth in the two sub-samples are both positive, but 
only significant for the post-crisis period. For domestic institutions, the sub-period results are again 
consistent with the full sample results. 
7.2.  The Shanghai and the Shenzhen stock exchanges 
We investigate whether the positive relationship between QFII participation and liquidity is 
prevalent in both the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). We 
therefore perform a panel regression analysis of the model in Eq. (6) by splitting the total sample into two 
sub-samples of stocks listed on the respective exchanges. Table 11 shows that the coefficient of QFII 
ownership for the quoted spread (the order book depth) is negative (positive) and significant on both stock 
exchanges. We find that the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates for quoted spread and order book 
depth on the SHSE (-0.693 and 1.149, respectively) are similar to the full sample estimates; however, they 
are smaller on the SZSE (-0.596 and 0.536, respectively). One possible reason for this difference is 
suggested by Figure 3, which shows that the investments by QFIIs in SHSE are increasing over time, 
while investments are relatively stable at a rather low level in SZSE. This implies that QFIIs prefer to 
invest on the SHSE rather than SZSE. Presumably there are distinct inherent factors in the two markets 
that govern this investment behavior. For example, SHSE attracts more large firms and state-owned firms, 
while SZSE attracts more small and medium-sized firms. 
[ Figure 3 about here ] 
[ Table 11 about here ] 
7.3.  Industry effects 
We re-estimate the model in Eq. (6) controlling for industry effects by including industry fixed effect 
dummies that are equal to 1 if the firm operates in a given industry and 0 if otherwise.25 The results show 
that controlling for industry effects does not alter the association between QFII ownership and liquidity. In 
addition, the joint effects of industry are not statistically significant in the regressions. The results are 
shown in Table 12. 
[ Table 12 about here ] 
7.4. QFII dummy variable effects 
For robustness check, we re-estimate the models in Tables 3 and 4 using a dummy variable for QFIIs 
that takes the value 1 if a firm has QFIIs’ participation and 0 if otherwise. Similarly, the variable of 
domestic institutional ownership is also replaced by a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if a firm 
has domestic institutional investors’ participation and 0 if otherwise. The results reported in Table 13 are 
related to the quoted spread (QS), the market depth (DEP), the price impact (PI) and the realized spread 
																																																								
25 See Eq. (9) and footnote 22. 
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(RS).26 The results are consistent with the findings reported in Tables 2, 3 and 4. QFIIs’ participation 
improves liquidity by reducing the quoted spread (QS) and increasing the market depth (DEP), and this 
improvement in liquidity is significantly linked to the reduced realized spread (RS).  
[ Table 13 about here ] 
8.  Summary and concluding remarks 
Previous studies argue that foreign institutional investors in emerging markets can lead to lower 
market liquidity, by either increasing information asymmetry or reducing trading activity. This paper 
investigates these issues with reference to the largest emerging market in the world. The Chinese stock 
market is characterized by a unique institutional and corporate governance structure, which offers some 
novel dimensions for studying the relationship between foreign institutional investors and liquidity. First, 
although it has been more than a decade since China liberalized its financial markets through the QFII 
system by allowing foreigners to hold a restricted amount of domestically listed stocks, surprisingly little 
is known about the links between this program and stock market liquidity. This special context is different 
from the previous studies on other emerging markets that permit large foreign ownership. It therefore 
provides a perfect setting for separating the effects of restricted foreign ownership on liquidity from the 
effects of large foreign ownership on liquidity.  
Our results reveal that greater foreign institutional participation is positively associated with stock 
market liquidity. This positive relationship operates mainly through the real friction channel rather than 
the informational friction channel, indicating that foreign participation increases trading activity and 
reduces the costs of real frictions on the stock market in China. Interestingly, in light of the restricted 
foreign ownership allowed, our results further suggest that the participation of foreign institutional 
investors also alters the trading activity through its influence on the trading activity of domestic investors. 
Our results are in stark contrast to the results in the literature concerning other developing countries where 
large foreign ownership is permitted, which report a negative association between foreign institutional 
ownership and liquidity. 
From a policy perspective, our results are indicative of a higher market quality in terms of lower costs 
of trading in general since the inception of the QFII system. The significant link between the QFII 
program and liquidity is also interesting given the relatively small quota of US$30 billion, only 
approximately 1% of total stock market capitalization, allocated to foreign holdings of domestic equity, 
with a maximum allowable QFII ownership in a single firm of 20%. Therefore, our findings imply that the 
strategies of foreign institutional investors are closely watched and followed by domestic investors. The 
positive impact of the first round of the QFII system on market liquidity also suggests that the decision by 
																																																								
26	We also estimate the models using the two measures for trading activity (the number of trade and trading volume) 
and the two measures for adverse selection component of spread (LSB and HS), and we find qualitatively similar 
results. To conserve space, these results are not reported here but they are available from the authors upon request.	
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China’s central government in 2012 to increase the foreign holding quota to US$80 billion, is heading in 
the right direction and will likely improve market liquidity. 
28	
	
Table 1.  Summary statistics for dependent and independent variables 
 
The data for the QFII ownership and large foreign ownership in each firm, and for domestic institutional ownership in the top 10 outstanding shareholders of a firm are from 
CCER. Intraday data from Thomson Reuters are used to compute the relative quoted spread (QS), the quoted depth (DEP), the price impact (PI), the realized spread (RS), the 
adverse selection components based on Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995) (LSB) and Huang and Stoll (1997) (HS), and the number of trades. The QS, DEP, PI, RS, LSB, HS and 
number of trades are averaged across all trading days for each stock in each quarter. Book value of a firm, share price, stock return, daily trading volume and leverage ratio 
are also from the CCER database. The turnover rate is calculated as the total trading volume in a quarter divided by shares outstanding. Volatility is calculated as the standard 
deviation of daily stock returns over quarters. The leverage ratio is measured as the company’s total debt divided by its total assets, while non-tradable share ratio is measured 
as a firm’s non-tradable shares divided by its total shares. The firm age is measured by current year deducting the established year. Return on assets is measured by net profit 
divided by total assets. Herfindahl 10 index measures ownership concentration among the top 10 shareholders. The data period is from the beginning of July 2004 to the end 
of March 2012. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std.dev. 95th Pctl. 75th Pctl. Median 25th Pctl. 5th Pctl. Skewness Kurtosis 
QFII ownership (QFII, %) 3836 1.795 2.040 4.572 2.151 1.277 0.718 0.280 4.571 36.321 
Large foreign ownership (FLO, %) 3374 14.864 15.712 46.153 25.165  9.502 1.480 0.391 1.243 4.343  
Domestic ownership (DI, %) 25880 6.285 6.482 17.550 9.350 4.477 1.544 0.322 3.449 33.775 
Relative quoted spread (QS, %) 37574 0.201 0.106 0.399 0.248 0.173 0.129 0.088 2.503 21.783 
Market Depth (DEP, shares) 37031 70099  183362  245828 65371  29758  14744 5936  19.899  713.895 
Price impact (PI, %) 37574 0.036  0.026  0.085  0.048  0.030  0.020  0.008  1.422 12.288 
Realized spread (RS, %) 37574 0.067  0.036  0.129  0.083  0.060  0.044  0.027  3.206 43.781 
LSB 37575 0.292  0.110  0.455  0.378  0.307  0.201  0.109  -0.169 2.328  
HS 37575 0.276  0.113  0.443  0.367  0.291  0.177  0.095  -0.114 2.155  
Turnover rate (TO, per quarter) 37575 1.570  1.139  3.935  2.130  1.265  0.708  0.293  1.210  4.161  
Number of trades (TRA, per day) 37575 2807  3024 8535  3445 1825  1000  399 3.562    29.316  
Trading volume (TV, shares, millions per 
day) 37575 7.156 11.523 22.698 8.643 4.031 1.693 0.513 9.711  206.631  
Size (SIZE, Yuan, billons) 37046 2.197 5.983 6.689 1.867 9.779 0.545 0.250 11.296 171.405 
Volatility (VOL, % per day) 37575 3.847  34.189  4.891  3.736  2.983  2.397  1.784  57.734 4051.931  
Share price (Yuan) 37575 11.901  10.455  31.150  14.670  8.780  5.530  3.060  3.611  30.521  
Non-tradable share ratio (NT) 37575 0.396 0.262 0.750 0.615 0.448 0.158 0.000 -0.278 1.766 
Leverage ratio (LEV) 37721 0.486  0.224  0.806  0.633  0.495  0.333  0.112  0.581  5.995  
Age (AGE, years) 37575 11.778  4.522  19.000  15.000  12.000  8.000  5.000  0.301  2.762  
Return on assets (ROA, % per quarter) 32786 0.031  0.044  0.092  0.041  0.020  0.008  0.002  23.486  1263.474  
Herfindahl 10 index (CO) 37557 0.176  0.123  0.410  0.250  0.150  0.080  0.030  1.116  4.225  
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Table 2. Preliminary analysis of the relationship between QFII and liquidity 
 
Comparison between mean values of the spreads, the adverse selection components and the trading 
activity variables for firms with (QFIIs) and firms without QFIIs (non-QFIIs) listed on the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. The sample period is 2004Q3-2012Q1. Column (4) shows the p-
value for a two-tailed t-test of equality of the variable values for QFII and non-QFII firms in columns 
(2) and (3). Data on QFII ownership for each firm are from the CCER database. Intraday data from 
Thomson Reuters are used to calculate the relative quoted spread (QS), the market depth (DEP), the 
price impact (PI), the realized spread (RS), the adverse selection components based on Lin, Sanger 
and Booth (1995) (LSB) and Huang and Stoll (1997) (HS), and the two trading activity measures 
daily trading volume in Yuan and number of trades. 
 
 
Variable Mean for non-QFII 
firms 




 Obs=33739 Obs=3836 
Relative quoted spread (QS, %) 0.205 0.161 0.000 
Market depth (DEP, shares) 69794 75571 0.030 
Price impact (PI, %) 0.038 0.027 0.000 
Realized spread (RS, %) 0.068 0.056 0.000 
LSB 0.295 0.258 0.000 
HS  0.280 0.241 0.000 
Trading volume (TV, shares, 
million per day) 6.853 9.819 0.000 





Table 3. QFII relationship with liquidity 
 
Panel regression results using the three measures of liquidity regressed on lagged ownership of QFIIs 
on SHSE and SZSE. The two measures of liquidity are the relative quoted spread (QS) and the market 
depth (DEP). DI denotes lagged domestic institutional ownership in the top 10 outstanding 
shareholders of a firm. Remaining control variables refer to firm and share characteristics: firm size 
measured by the log of book value (SIZE), degree of leverage (LEV), the log volatility of stock 
returns (VOL), the log of share price (LNP) and the log of turnover rate of shares traded (TO). We 
also control for the non-tradable ratio (NT) and the state dummy (STATE), with a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if a firm is state-owned and 0 if otherwise. The period of study is from 2004Q3 to 2012Q1. 
A pooled OLS regression is run using quarterly fixed effects due to the unbalanced panel. Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to correlation across residuals within a firm 
over time, and across firms in the same quarter and different quarters. ***, ** and * denote that the 
coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
  Dependent Variables  
 Independent (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Variables Log(QS) Log(QS) Log(DEP) Log(DEP) 
,  -0.588*** -0.616*** 1.021*** 1.005*** 
(0.180) (0.181) (0.319) (0.302) 
,  0.329*** -0.193 
(0.062) (0.173) 
,  -0.131*** -0.133*** 0.457*** 0.455*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.019) (0.019) 
,  -0.029*** -0.029*** 0.018* 0.018* 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) 
,  -0.002 -0.007 0.359*** 0.357*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.025) 
,  0.030 0.031 -0.012 -0.011 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.041) (0.041) 
,  -0.332*** -0.348*** -1.397*** -1.406*** 
(0.029) (0.027) (0.047) (0.052) 
,  -0.121*** -0.118*** 0.208*** 0.210*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.027) (0.028) 
,  0.278*** 0.284*** -0.963*** -0.959*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.056) (0.055) 
R2 0.761 0.762 0.863 0.863 











Table 4. QFII relationship with trading activity and adverse selection cost 
 
Panel regression results for real and informational frictions. The real friction regressions use as 
dependent variables the realized spread and two measures of trading activity: number of trades (TRA) 
and trading volume (TV). The informational friction regressions use as dependent variables the price 
impact and the adverse selection component of the spread based on Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995) 
(LSB) and Huang and Stoll (1997) (HS). The period of study is from 2004Q3 to 2012Q1. A pooled 
OLS regression is run using quarterly fixed effects due to the unbalanced panel. Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to correlation across residuals within a firm over 
time, and across firms in the same quarter and different quarters. ***, ** and * denote that the 



















            
,  -0.752*** 1.005* 0.597** -0.034 -0.232 -0.358 
(0.248) (0.520) (0.246) (0.373) (0.208) (0.222) 
,  0.470*** -1.100*** -0.492 0.333*** 0.023 0.028 
(0.084) (0.166) (0.504) (0.101) (0.089) (0.094) 
,  -0.152*** 0.458*** 0.551*** -0.159*** -0.210*** -0.218*** 
(0.008) (0.015) (0.021) (0.022) (0.007) (0.008) 
,  -0.042*** 0.089*** 0.032** -0.040*** -0.027*** -0.042*** 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.015) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) 
,  0.004 0.369*** 0.409*** -0.147*** -0.205*** -0.231*** 
  (0.023) (0.038) (0.036) (0.016) (0.011) (0.013) 
,  0.055 0.684*** 0.880*** -0.079** 0.029 0.012 
(0.036) (0.064) (0.064) (0.032) (0.020) (0.019) 
,  -0.304*** -0.088*** -0.556*** -0.425*** 0.143*** 0.118*** 
(0.026) (0.031) (0.033) (0.040) (0.017) (0.016) 
,  -0.121***  -0.163*** -0.073*** -0.083*** 
(0.007)  (0.017) (0.009) (0.010) 
,  0.287*** -0.962*** -0.972*** 0.527*** 0.470*** 0.538*** 
(0.043) (0.038) (0.082) (0.028) (0.016) (0.017) 
R2 0.611 0.631 0.711 0.552 0.474 0.471 




















Table 5. QFII and large foreign ownership relationship with liquidity 
 
Panel regression results using QS, DEP, PI and RS regressed on lagged QFIIs and FLOs (i.e. large 
foreign ownership) for a firm listed on SHSE and SZSE. The period of study is from 2004Q3 to 
2012Q1. A pooled OLS regression is run using quarterly fixed effects due to the unbalanced panel. 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to correlation across residuals within 
a firm over time, and across firms in the same quarter and different quarters. ***, ** and * denote that 
the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
  Dependent Variables  
 Independent (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Variables Log(QS) Log(DEP) Log(PI) Log(RS) 
,  -0.578** 0.127* -0.443 -0.470** 
(0.220) (0.058) (0.270) (0.165) 
,  0.113** -0.041*** 0.113 0.130** 
 (0.049) (0.007) (0.088) (0.044) 
,  0.125*** -0.023* 0.221*** 0.139*** 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.027) (0.018) 
,  -0.113*** 0.043*** -0.120*** -0.112*** 
(0.015) (0.004) (0.029) (0.010) 
,  -0.014*** 0.010** -0.024 -0.020*** 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.013) (0.004) 
,  -0.028 0.047*** -0.203*** -0.003 
 (0.034) (0.002) (0.035) (0.048) 
,  -0.009 -0.011** -0.026 -0.008 
(0.025) (0.004) (0.032) (0.030) 
,  -0.374*** -0.144*** -0.430*** -0.335*** 
(0.033) (0.006) (0.026) (0.041) 
,  -0.205*** 0.027*** -0.217*** -0.211*** 
(0.013) (0.006) (0.031) (0.011) 
,  0.289*** -0.072*** 0.400*** 0.299*** 
 (0.033) (0.013) (0.035) (0.047) 
R2 0.782 0.860 0.616 0.677 







Table 6. Granger causality tests 
 
The table shows Granger causality tests that identify the lead-lag relationship between QFII 
ownership and liquidity using the regression specifications in Eq. (7) and Eq. (8). We use two 
liquidity measures, the quoted spread (QS) and the order book depth (DEP). We restrict the lag 
lengths of the QFII ownership and the liquidity measures to be equal. We apply five different lag 
specifications, from one lag up to five lags. The control variables are the same as in Eq. (6). We run 
pooled OLS regressions using quarterly fixed effects due to the unbalanced panel, with Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors that are robust to correlation across residuals within a firm over time and across 
firms in the same quarter and different quarters. The columns show the F-statistics and the 
corresponding p-values for the null hypotheses. 
 
 
 QFII (Granger) causes QS QS (Granger) causes QFII 
No. of lags F-value p-value F-value p-value 
1 10.020 0.004 0.400 0.674 
2 3.100 0.043 0.310 0.818 
3 3.140 0.030 0.250 0.906 
4 3.040 0.027 0.120 0.986 
5 3.160 0.019 0.660 0.680 
QFII (Granger) causes DEP DEP (Granger) causes QFII 
No. of lags F-value p-value F-value p-value 
1 9.390 0.008 0.370 0.692 
2 7.610 0.001 0.190 0.899 
3 8.000 0.000 0.320 0.864 
4 4.960 0.003 0.380 0.857 





Table 7. Endogeneity test 
 
The table shows a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression analysis. The QFII ownership is the 
dependent variable in the first-stage estimation described in Eq. (9), while the second stage estimates 
the baseline model described in Eq. (6), by replacing the actual QFII ownership with lagged value of 
residuals R_QFII from the first stage estimation. We use two liquidity measures, the quoted spread 
(QS) and the order book depth (DEP). In addition to the control variables in Eq. (6), we add as new 
control variables to the first stage estimations: the return on assets (ROA), the firm age (AGE), an 
ownership concentration index (Herfindahl 10 index, OC) and industry fixed effect dummies that are 
equal to 1 if the firm operates in a given industry and 0 if otherwise. The period of study is from 
2004Q3 to 2012Q1. A pooled OLS regression is run using quarterly fixed effects due to the 
unbalanced panel. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to correlation 
across residuals within a firm over time, and across firms in the same quarter and different quarters. 
***, ** and * denote that the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
  Dependent variable  
 Independent (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Variables QFII Log(QS) QFII Log(DEP) 
,  0.005 
(0.055) 
,    -0.010  
   (0.013)  
_ ,  0.003 0.004 
(0.003) (0.008) 
,  0.315** 0.339*** 0.302** -0.305 
 (0.131) (0.062) (0.137) (0.198) 
,  0.066*** -0.135*** 0.068*** 0.455*** 
(0.011) (0.013) (0.008) (0.024) 
,  -0.026** -0.029*** -0.026** 0.032** 
(0.010) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013) 
,  0.176*** -0.013 0.189*** 0.339*** 
 (0.042) (0.020) (0.041) (0.045) 
,   -0.089** 0.012 -0.084** 0.461*** 
(0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.064) 
,  0.187*** -0.339*** 0.175*** -0.980*** 
(0.028) (0.033) (0.032) (0.067) 
,  -0.116*** 0.282*** 
(0.010) (0.041) 
,   0.249***  -0.944*** 
  (0.032)  (0.050) 
,   0.236  0.282*  
 (0.147)  (0.139)  
, 	 0.021**  0.023**  
	 (0.010)  (0.011)  
,  -0.103  -0.125*  
 (0.075)  (0.073)  
R2 0.070 0.745 0.072 0.635 
Time dummy YES YES YES YES 




Table 8. First difference model 
 
The table shows panel regressions of changes in the quoted spread (QS), the order book depth (DEP), 
the realized spread (RS) and the price impact (PI) on changes in the QFII ownership. The period of 
study is from 2004Q3 to 2012Q1. A pooled OLS regression is run using quarterly fixed effects due to 
the unbalanced panel. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to correlation 
across residuals within a firm over time, and across firms in the same quarter and different quarters. 
***, ** and * denote that the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 











                        
∆ ,  -0.136* 0.394* -0.277** -0.014 
 (0.069) (0.222) (0.115) (0.867) 
∆ ,  0.049 -1.072* 0.146 0.175 
 (0.163) (0.545) (0.189) (0.114) 
∆ ,  -0.027*** 0.011 -0.034*** -0.043 
(0.009) (0.026) (0.008) (0.027) 
∆ ,  -0.009 0.005 -0.014 -0.007 
 (0.007) (0.031) (0.012) (0.028) 
∆ ,  0.033 0.247*** 0.109*** -0.125*** 
 (0.022) (0.074) (0.029) (0.042) 
∆ ,  0.048*** 0.403*** 0.072*** -0.023 
(0.008) (0.048) (0.012) (0.015) 
∆ ,  -0.070*** -0.152* 0.001 -0.241*** 
(0.019) (0.081) (0.019) (0.052) 
∆ ,  -0.070*** 0.324*** -0.051*** -0.125*** 
(0.006) (0.031) (0.004) (0.022) 
∆ ,  0.158*** -0.912*** 0.069*** 0.386*** 
 (0.019) (0.088) (0.021) (0.068) 
R2 0.519 0.245 0.184 0.208 





Table 9. Fixed effects model 
 
The table shows fixed effects panel regressions of the quoted spread (QS), the order book depth 
(DEP), the realized spread (RS) and the price impact (PI) on the QFII ownership. The period of study 
is from 2004Q3 to 2012Q1. A pooled OLS regression is run using quarterly fixed effects due to the 
unbalanced panel. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to correlation 
across residuals within a firm over time, and across firms in the same quarter and different quarters. 
***, ** and * denote that the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
  Dependent variable  
 Independent (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 variables Log(QS) Log(DEP) Log(RS) Log(PI) 
,  -0.200** 0.588*** -0.294*** -0.643 
(0.075) (0.135) (0.084) (0.582) 
,  0.337*** -0.191 0.201*** 0.534*** 
(0.032) (0.353) (0.046) (0.159) 
,  -0.094*** 0.034 -0.141*** -0.086*** 
(0.010) (0.022) (0.009) (0.017) 
,  -0.010 0.000 -0.021** -0.013 
(0.006) (0.018) (0.009) (0.016) 
,  0.121*** 0.191*** 0.149*** -0.116*** 
 (0.018) (0.048) (0.023) (0.031) 
,  0.046* 0.410*** 0.079*** 0.062 
(0.023) (0.053) (0.026) (0.042) 
,  -0.318*** -0.744*** -0.240*** -0.673*** 
(0.024) (0.062) (0.027) (0.030) 
,  -0.098*** 0.325*** -0.093*** -0.186*** 
(0.009) (0.031) (0.008) (0.023) 
,  0.163*** -0.859*** 0.134*** 0.655*** 
 (0.019) (0.042) (0.022) (0.038) 
Within R2 0.467 0.594 0.545 0.511 


















Table 10. Influence of the global financial crisis 
 
The table shows panel regressions of the quoted spread (QS) and the order book depth (DEP) on the 
QFII ownership. The period of study is from 2004Q3 to 2012Q1. The sample 1 period is 2004Q3 to 
2007Q4 while the sample 2 period is 2008Q1 to 2012Q1. A pooled OLS regression is run using 
quarterly fixed effects due to the unbalanced panel. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors reported in 
parentheses are robust to correlation across residuals within a firm over time, and across firms in the 
same quarter and different quarters. ***, ** and * denote that the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% 





 Dependent variable  










,  -0.746** 0.941 -0.679*** 1.123*** 
(0.293) (0.684) (0.213) (0.265) 
,  0.372*** -0.114 0.237** -0.395** 
 (0.076) (0.250) (0.098) (0.176) 
,  -0.163*** 0.512*** -0.108*** 0.405*** 
(0.017) (0.028) (0.003) (0.012) 
,  -0.016** -0.001 -0.034*** 0.042*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) 
,  0.029* 0.399*** -0.057*** 0.315*** 
  (0.016) (0.024) (0.014) (0.024) 
,  0.056 -0.013 0.008 0.008 
(0.035) (0.061) (0.050) (0.035) 
,  -0.315*** -1.262*** -0.371*** -1.542*** 
 (0.053) (0.076) (0.019) (0.014) 
,  -0.136*** 0.217*** -0.100*** 0.198*** 
(0.010) (0.049) (0.011) (0.020) 
,  0.257*** -1.174*** 0.266*** -0.833*** 
 (0.027) (0.048) (0.036) (0.037) 
R2 0.702 0.848 0.600 0.887 





Table 11. Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 
 
The table shows panel regressions of the quoted spread (QS) and the order book depth (DEP) on the 
QFII ownership estimated for the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(SZSE) separately. The period of study is from 2004Q3 to 2012Q1. A pooled OLS regression is run 
using quarterly fixed effects due to the unbalanced panel. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors reported in 
parentheses are robust to correlation across residuals within a firm over time, and across firms in the 
same quarter and different quarters. ***, ** and * denote that the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 Dependent variable 












,  -0.693*** 1.149*** -0.596** 0.536* 
(0.218) (0.394) (0.246) (0.293) 
,  0.315*** -0.554** 0.395*** -0.054 
 (0.064) (0.225) (0.074) (0.154) 
,  -0.129*** 0.414*** -0.141*** 0.469*** 
(0.010) (0.015) (0.011) (0.026) 
,  -0.014*** 0.067*** -0.035*** -0.080*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
,  0.026 0.270*** -0.032 0.355*** 
  (0.018) (0.027) (0.019) (0.038) 
,  0.039 -0.002 0.027 -0.035 
(0.031) (0.041) (0.034) (0.047) 
,  -0.364*** -1.420*** -0.336*** -1.372*** 
 (0.031) (0.048) (0.027) (0.053) 
,  -0.117*** 0.201*** -0.120*** 0.219*** 
(0.009) (0.023) (0.008) (0.035) 
,  0.223*** -1.041*** 0.334*** -0.709*** 
 (0.017) (0.057) (0.033) (0.086) 
R2 0.769 0.883 0.761 0.842 





Table 12. Industry effects 
 
The table shows the results from regressions including industry fixed effects. Based on the CSRC 
classification, there are in total 13 industries. The period of study is from 2004Q3 to 2012Q1. A 
pooled OLS regression is run using quarterly fixed effects due to the unbalanced panel. Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to correlation across residuals within a firm 
over time, and across firms in the same quarter and different quarters. ***, ** and * denote that the 
coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
	
  Dependent Variables  
Independent (1) (2) 
Variables Log(QS) Log(DEP) 
,  -0.550*** 0.863*** 
(0.178) (0.300) 
,  0.324*** 0.154 
 (0.061) (0.177) 
,  -0.131*** 0.450*** 
(0.010) (0.019) 
,  -0.025*** 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.009) 
,  -0.034** 0.422*** 
(0.016) (0.027) 
,  0.023 0.011 
(0.032) (0.039) 
,  -0.342*** -1.407*** 
(0.027) (0.052) 
,  -0.111*** 0.195*** 
(0.009) (0.028) 
,  0.245*** -0.917*** 
(0.026) (0.054) 
R2 0.762 0.864 
Time dummy YES YES 
Industry dummy YES YES 
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Table 13. QFII relationship with liquidity 
 
Panel regression results using the three measures of liquidity regressed on lagged value of QFIIDUM, 
with a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has QFII participation and 0 if otherwise. The two 
measures of liquidity are the relative quoted spread (QS) and the market depth (DEP). DIDUM 
denotes 1 if a firm has domestic institutional investors’ participation and 0 if otherwise. The 
remaining control variables are the same as the ones used in Table 3. The period of study is from 
2004Q3 to 2012Q1. A pooled OLS regression is run using quarterly fixed effects due to the 
unbalanced panel. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to correlation 
across residuals within a firm over time, and across firms in the same quarter and different quarters. 
***, ** and * denote that the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
  Dependent Variables  
 Independent (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Variables Log(QS) Log(DEP) Log(PI) Log(RS) 
,  -0.038*** 0.060** -0.022 -0.024*** 
(0.005) (0.027) (0.019) (0.006) 
,  0.032*** -0.026 0.065*** 0.021** 
(0.009) (0.044) (0.014) (0.009) 
,  -0.125*** 0.380*** -0.149*** -0.144*** 
(0.013) (0.019) (0.029) (0.009) 
,  -0.029*** 0.060*** -0.041*** -0.043*** 
(0.006) (0.015) (0.004) (0.008) 
,  -0.018 0.520*** -0.160*** -0.007 
 (0.021) (0.052) (0.018) (0.029) 
,  0.020 0.441*** -0.094** 0.045 
(0.034) (0.065) (0.039) (0.038) 
,  -0.316*** -1.039*** -0.388*** -0.271*** 
(0.034) (0.060) (0.047) (0.033) 
,  -0.116*** 0.264*** -0.156*** -0.121*** 
(0.011) (0.042) (0.022) (0.007) 
,  0.243*** -0.927*** 0.470*** 0.249*** 
 (0.033) (0.053) (0.032) (0.050) 
R2 0.757 0.620 0.550 0.605 






Figure 1. Liquidity and total value of QFII holdings over time 
 
The relative quoted spread and market depth are computed using intraday data provided by Thomson 
Reuters. We average all three liquidity measures across firms and the sum total value of QFII 
holdings for all firms in each quarter (billion Yuan). 
 
Panel A: Relative quoted bid-ask spread (the right y-axis) and total value of QFII holdings for all 




Panel B: Quoted depth (the right y-axis) and the total value of QFII holdings for all firms in each 





































































































































































Figure 3. Total QFII holdings for all firms in each quarter (billion Yuan) in Shanghai Stock 
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